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War Crimes and the Jurisdiction Maze
As in all wars the conflict in Viet Nam has resulted in numerous
charges and counter charges concerning the commission of war crimes in
violation of international law. The fact that war crimes are not necessarily
limited to the other side has been pointed out vividly by several incidents
involving U.S. personnel, including My Lai.
The purpose of this article is not to review these incidents, but to discuss
whether or not the United States is in a position domestically to carry out
its international obligations to prosecute war criminals under International
Common Law and The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, For the
Protection of War Victims.'
Each of the Geneva conventions contains the common requirement that
each party will undertake to enact legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave
breaches of the conventions which include serious war crimes. 2 The arti-
cles dealing with grave breaches are identical in the four conventions
except that the enumeration of the violations of a particular convention
which constitutes grave breaches varies somewhat with the subject matter
of the convention. 3
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' (1955), 6 U.S.T. 3114.
2 The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
each person, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial
to another High Contracting Party concerned,' provided such High Contracting Party has
made out a prima facie case. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Prisoners in Time of War ofAugust 12, 1949 (1955), 6 U.S.T. 3616.
3 Art. 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of ihe Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1955), 6 U.S.T. 3114; Art. 51 of the 1949
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1955), 6 U.S.T. 3217; Art. 147 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1955), 6 U.S.T.
3516.
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These conventions entered into force with respect to the United States
on February 2, 1956. Secretary of State Rusk, by letter dated August 10,
1965, notified the International Red Cross that the United States was
applying the provisions of the Conventions to the hostilities in Viet Nam.4
"Grave breaches" as used in the Geneva Conventions, do not include all
war crimes. For example, the intentional killing of a noncombatant South
Vietnamese civilian while engaged in a combat operation, would be a war
crime under international law, but not a grave breach under the Geneva
Conventions. The Conventions do not classify such offsenses as grave
breaches when the victim is the national of a co-belligerent. However, if
the victim were a national of North Vietnam, the offense would be a grave
breach under the Conventions.5
Even though war crimes may not all be grave breaches under the
Geneva Conventions, it has always been the policy of the United States to
punish all individuals who commit war crimes in violation of international
law, whether or not they are in violation of the Geneva Conventions. 6
The mandate is clear, but is the United States in a position to provide
effective penal sanctions for all war crimes? In order to answer this ques-
tion it is necessary to review the various methods of prosecuting war
crimes under our domestic law. The possible methods are trial by
courts-martial, by federal courts and by military commissions.
Trial by Courts-Martial
While courts-martial have no part of the jurisdiction set apart under the
article of the constitution which relates to the judicial power of the United
States, they have an equally certain constitutional source. They are estab-
lished under the constitutional power of Congress to make rules for the
government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States, and
they are recognized in the provisions of the fifth amendment, expressly
exempting "cases arising in the land and naval forces" from the require-
ment of presentment and indictment by grand jury.
Servicemen on active duty with the United States Armed Forces, and
who have not been separated from the service since commission of the
450 Department of State Bulletin at 447.
5Article 147 of the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons defines
grave breaches as unlawful acts committed against protected persons. A protected person, as
defined in Article 4 of this Convention, does not include nationals of a co-belligerent state.
Since South Viet Nam is a co-belligerent state, South Vietnamese nationals would not be
considered protected persons under the convention. (1955) 6 U.S.T. 3618, 3520.6Sec. 504 F.M. 27- 10, Dept. of the Army, July 1956, The Law of Land Warfare:
Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment as Formulated by the International Law
Commission, 1950 U.N. General Assembly Record, 5th Session, Supp. 12 (A/1316).
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offense, are subject to trial for committing war crimes, by military
courts-martial. There is a serious question, however, whether civilians
serving with the armed forces, or individuals who were on active duty at
the time of the offense but subsequently discharged from the armed ser-
vices, would presently be subject to such jurisdiction.
When the Uniform Code of Military Justice was being drafted, the
problem of crimes being discovered after the offender was discharged from
the service, was recognized and specifically covered by Article 3(a) of the
Uniform Code. This article provided that discharged servicemen might be
tried by court-martial for offenses under the code committed while on
active duty, when such offenses occurred beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States courts, and were punishable by confinement for five years or
more.
7
Civilians committing crimes while accompanying the armed forces over-
seas were also subject to trial by court-martial under Article 2(10) and (11)
of the Uniform Code. 8 Upon passage of this act, it appeared that all war
crimes occurring outside the jurisdiction of our civil courts could be pun-
ished by the use of courts-martial. This was the position of the executive
branch as stated in a letter from the Department of Justice to the Chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, during hearings
on the Geneva Conventions.9
In 1955, the United States Air Force attempted to use the jurisdiction
provision of Article 3(a) to bring a former airman (Toth) to trial before a
court-martial. 10 Toth had been honorably discharged from the Air Force,
and had returned to his home where he was employed in a steel plant. Five
months after his discharge, he was arrested by military authorities on
charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while serving as an
airman in Korea. The Supreme Court held "that Congress cannot subject
civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians are
entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular
courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution."" Although this case
70 U.S.C. 803.
8Art. 2 Persons subject to this chapter-
The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(10) In times of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a
party to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or
accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the following: The
Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, 10 U.S.C. 802 (10) (II).
9 Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, 1st
Sess., June 3, 1955, on the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims.
'
0 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
'lid. at 23.
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did not involve a war crime or a treaty obligation of the United States, the
result made it quite clear that the Supreme Court was going to limit
drastically, court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.
The next line of cases involving trial of civilians by court-martial con-
cerned dependents of servicemen and U.S. Government employees accom-
panying the armed forces overseas. 12 In these cases, the Supreme Court
held that even though a treaty provides for trial of civilians by court-martial
such jurisdiction cannot be allowed, since the treaty is subject to the
Constitution, and trial by court-martial of civilians accompanying the
armed forces overseas during peacetime does not meet the requirements of
Article III, Sec. 2, or the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
The most recent Supreme Court case involving court-martial jurisdiction
is O'Callahan v. Parker.'3 In this case the Supreme Court held that a
court-martial could not exercise jurisdiction over a serviceman charged
with attempted rape, assault with intent to rape and housebreaking, when
the offenses occurred in a civilian hotel in Hawaii while the serviceman
was on pass. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, cited the cases
previously discussed involving court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, and
concluded that these cases "decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction
to try those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter how
intimate the connection between their offense and the concerns of military
discipline.' 4
In a recent case, Latney v. Ignatius15, the U.S. Army attempted to
exercise jurisdiction over a U.S. National civilian under Article 2(10) of
the Uniform Code, which provides that in time of war, persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field are subject to trial by
court-martial. In this case, a merchant seaman was found guilty of com-
mitting murder, by a court-martial sitting in Viet Nam. At the time the
offense was committed, the sailor was on shore leave from a U.S. civil-
ian-owned and operated merchant vessel docked in Danang harbor, and
discharging cargo for the U.S. Forces in Viet Nam.
Upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Federal District Court
upheld the court-martial jurisdiction. On appeal, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
lower court's judgment. The Court of Appeals conceded that there was a
period of undeclared war which permitted some interventions of the war
'
2Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
13395 U.S. 258 (1969).
141d. at 267.
15416 F.2d 821 (CA DC- 1969).
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power under which Article 2(10) was enacted, but they held that there was
not sufficient connection between the civilian and the military to apply the
war power in this particular case. In this respect, the court pointed out, the
accused was employed by a private shipping company, and was in no
closer proximity to the armed forces than a seaman living on his ship and
under the discipline of his civilian captain, who had been granted shore
leave while waiting for the ship to turn around. 16
From the court's opinion, it appears that jurisdiction under the Uniform
Code might have been upheld by the Court as an appropriate war power if
the civilian had actually been accompanying the armed forces in a combat
situation. Such a holding would still not settle the question of jurisdiction
over the individual who had returned to the United States, and resumed a
full civilian status before his involvement with the offense was discovered,
as in the Toth case. Consequently, even though court-martial jurisdiction
might attach under certain conditions, it is not the answer to the overall
war-crime jurisdiction problem.
Trial by Federal Courts
At present, except for certain offenses against the United States itself,
such as treason, espionage, fraud against the Government, and larceny of
Government property, wrongful acts committed by civilians in foreign
countries (which would be crimes if committed in the United States), do
not violate laws of the United States, and cannot be punished by the
United States Federal civilian courts.
There have been several bills introduced in Congress designed to fill this
void. 17 None of these bills up to this time has achieved the concurrence of
the military departments, and the endorsement of Congressional com-
mittees, necessary for passage. But, even if such legislation were passed,
there are many inherent problems in attempting to use the Federal courts
to punish war crimes.
First, foreign countries are very jealous of their sovereignty, and in most
instances would not allow a foreign civilian court, not connected with the
military, to hold trials in their country. Second, if the trial were held
outside the area where the war crime occurred, the problem of obtaining
foreign witnesses and producing other evidence would, in some instances,
be most difficult. Third, it would be more appropriate to try all individuals
charged with committing war crimes by the same type of court, rather than
U.S. civilians by Federal civilian courts, and U.S. servicemen and prison-
ers of war by courts-martial.
161d. at 823.17 H.R. 4225, 91 st Congress (1969). S. 3189, 91st Congress (1969).
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In this respect, the Geneva Conventions provide that prisoners of war
can be sentenced validly only if the sentence is pronounced by the same
courts, according to the same procedures as in the cases of members of the
armed forces of the detaining power.' Another factor to consider is that if
such legislation were passed now, subjecting U.S. Civilians committing war
crimes to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, it is very doubtful that
jurisdiction could be maintained over former servicemen who have been
accused of committing war crimes in Viet Nam.
It is clear that retroactive alterations of a forum, or the transfer of a class
of criminal cases from the cognizance of one type of civilian court to
another, does not violate the prohibition against ex-post-facto laws;'9 but
any statute which operates to remove a defense may be applied only with
respect to offenses committed after the date of the statute's enactment.
20 If
any offenses which have occurred in Viet Nam may presently be tried by
another forum within the civilian legal system, authorizing trial by a district
court might not be ex-post-facto, but since such jurisdiction did not pre-
viously exist in the civilian courts, the statute is very likely to fail as to
such defendants, because it acts to deprive them of a legal defense which
existed at the time of the actions for which they now are to be tried. 21 The
many problems associated with attempting to make war crimes triable by
Federal civilian courts would not make such a procedure advisable if a
better method is available.
Trial by Military Commission
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to define and pun-
ish offenses against the law of nations." The Constitution also empowers
Congress to "declare war and raise armies," which in turn authorizes the
employment of all necessary and proper agencies for the prosecution of the
wars. The military commission is simply an instrumentality for the more
efficient execution of the war power vested in Congress and the power
vested in the President as Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Con-
gress has specifically recognized the right of military commissions to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over offenses in violation of the laws of war.22 Hence, in
our military law, the distinctive name of military commission has been
adopted for the exclusively war-court which is a distinct tribunal from the
court-martial. Congress has delegated to the President the authority to
'
8Article 102, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949 (1955) 6 U.S.T. 3394.
19Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894).20Beszell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1952).
21United States v. Starr, 27 F. Cas. 1296 (No. 16, 379) (C.C.D. Ark. 1846).
2210 U.S.C. 821 (1956).
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prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before military
commissions. 23
The military commission was first utilized by the United States in 1847
during the occupation by our forces of a portion of the territory of Mex-
ico. 24 They have been used by the United States in each conflict since the
Mexican War, and have been recognized by the United States courts as a
common law court on numerous occasions. In a case involving World War
II war crimes, General Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philip-
pines, was convicted and given a death sentence by a United States
military commission. The Supreme Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of
the military commission, stated that:
the extent to which the powers to prosecute violations of the law of war shall
be exercised before peace is declared rests, not with the courts, but with the
political branch of the Government.
25
In the case of Madsen v. Kinsella26 the Supreme Court specifically
upheld the constitutionality of the military commission for meeting urgent
governmental responsibilities related to war. In this case, a U.S. citizen-
dependent accompanying the military occupation forces in Germany, was
tried and convicted by an occupation court in 1950 for murdering her hus-
band, a U.S. Army officer. The Supreme Court stated that these courts
"derived their authority from the President as occupation courts or tribu-
nals, in the nature of military commissions, in areas still occupied by
United States troops."'27 The Supreme Court further pointed out that
occupation courts for Germany had less of a military character than a
court-martial. Civilian judges with substantial legal experience were ap-
pointed to the bench. The rights of individuals were safeguarded by a Code
of Criminal Procedure dealing with warrants, summons, preliminary hear-
2Art. 36. President may prescribe rules-
(a) The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of
inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or in-
consistent with this chapter. 10 U.S.C. 836 (1956).24 By M.G.O. 20 of February 19, 1847, issued from the Headquarters of the Army at
Tampico, it was announced that "assassination, murder, poisoning, rape, or the attempt to
commit either malicious stabbing or maiming, malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft, the
wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries, or other religious edifices anii-fixtures ... wheth-
er committed by Mexican or other civilians in Mexico against individuals of the U.S. military
forces, or by which individuals against other such individuals or against Mexicans or civil-
ians ... should be brought to trial before military commission. WINTHROP'S MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS, Second Edition, 1920, p. 832.
2SIn Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 13 (1946).
26343 U.S. 341 (1952).
271 d. at 357.
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ings, trials, evidence, witnesses, findings, sentences, contempts, review of
cases and appeals. 28
Jurisdiction over U.S. nationals by the same type of tribunal has recently
been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in the case of Rose v. McNamara2 9 which arose in Okinawa
where a U.S. citizen was convicted of a criminal charge of evading income
taxes by a military-government court. In sustaining jurisdiction, the court
pointed out that the court procedure required grand-jury indictment and
petit-jury trial. With respect to the defendant's claims that her con-
stitutional rights were violated (unless tried in an Article III Court), the
court stated that the power of the President, in the conduct of govern-
mental business of international consequences, has traditionally been view-
ed by the courts as broad, and that the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the extensive power of the President to set up special tribunals
in occupied foreign lands to try American citizens.
It is difficult to see the legal distinction used by the courts in upholding
jurisdiction over civilians by military commissions, while denying such
jurisdiction to courts-martial. The key to this distinction appears to be the
"civilianization" of the military commission, which specifically provides for
indictment, and for trial either by petit jury or by experienced civilian
judges. Throughout the cases involving courts-martial jurisdiction, there
runs a thread indicating a basic distrust of the Military Justice System.
Once the trial is turned over to civilian oriented courts, even though they
are under military jurisdiction, the courts have been much more lenient in
their attitude toward jurisdiction. In any event, from the holdings of these
cases, there is a legal basis for the President to establish an executive-court
system with the sole responsibility of handling war crimes. The con-
stitutionality of these courts would be based upon the war power under
domestic and international common law, and through the President's au-
thority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Conclusion
The United States is presently in a position to conduct trials, and
adequately to punish all war criminals including U.S. civilians, through the
use of the military commission. In view of the stress placed by the courts
on the civilian nature of the military commission, in cases in which jurisdic-
tion over cilvilians has been upheld, the commission should be especially
created by the President to exercise this war-power authority. There would
28 1d. at 358-359.
29375 Fed. 2d 924 (1968), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1969).
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not be a problem of ex post facto application, as jurisdiction already rested
with the military commission.
The rules of procedure promulgated by the President should include the
right to indictment by a proceeding patterned after the federal grand-jury
proceedings, and a right to choice of trial before a panel of experienced
civilian judges, or by a jury drawn from U.S. nationals residing in the area.
Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives the President
statutory authority to establish such a procedure for military commis-
sions.30 Such rules would have to provide for mandatory jury duty on the
part of U.S. nationals residing in the area in which the commission is
sitting. Article 47 of the Uniform Code provides for the procurement of
witnesses before the military commission with appropriate penalty proce-
dures in case the witness fails to comply with such service. 31
The responsibility for prbsecuting these cases should be placed upon
The Judge Advocate General of the branch of the armed services involved.
The accused should be provided with counsel at government expense, from
the point of initial interrogation. In addition, he should be allowed to retain
counsel of his choice at his own expense. As a part of the procedure, the
accused should have a right of appeal to an appellate court which would be
independent from the trial court. In this regard it would be advisable to
establish a two-tier appellate proceeding, similar to the Federal court
system, with the final appellate court being the United States Court of




'Art. 47. Refusal to appear or testify-
(a) Any person not subject to this chapter who-
(I) has been duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness before a court-martial,
military commission, court of inquiry, or any other military court or board, or before
any military or civil officer designated to take a deposition to be read in evidence before
such a court, commission, or board;
(2) has been duly paid or tendered the fees and mileage of a witness at the rates
allowed to witnesses attending the courts of the United States; and
(3) Willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to qualify as a witness or to
testify or to produce any evidence which that person may have been legally subpoe-
naed to produce; is guilty of an offense against the United States.
(b) Any person who commits an offense named in subsection (a) shall be tried on
information in a United States district court, or in a court of original criminal jurisdic-
tion in any of the Territories, Commonwealths, or possessions of the United States,
and jurisdiction is conferred upon these courts for that purpose. Upon conviction, such
a person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not
more than six months or both.
(c) The United States attorney, or the officer prosecuting for the United States, in
any such court of original criminal jurisdiction shall, upon the certification of the facts
to him by the military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, file an information
against and prosecute any person violating this article.
(d) The fees and mileage of witnesses shall be advanced or paid out of the appropria-
tions for the compensation of witnesses. 10 U.S.C. 84 (1956).
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This executive court system would not neet to be staffed at all times. It
would be sufficient to establish its framework so that it could be staffed
during periods of armed conflict. These courts should exercise jurisdiction
over all war crimes for which the United States has responsibility, to see
that adequate punishment is imposed. This would exclude courts-martial
from exercising jurisdiction in any case involving a war crime. Besides
establishing a uniform system for handling war crimes, there would be a
specific benefit with regard to Viet Nam, since former servicemen charged
with the commission of war crimes could be brought before these courts
and could not escape punishment through lack of a forum for trial.
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